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selves. 230 The overarching concern is that the expense of litigation and 
potential for extremely high awards of damages serve as strong incentive 
for named defendants to accept settlement letters, irrespective of their 
·1 . 231 gm t or mnocence. In one of the only file sharing cases to proceed to 
litigation, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, a $1,920,000 verdict 
re~dered against a defendant who shared twenty-four copyrighted songs 
usmg a P2P network, subsequently remitted to $54,000.232 
.Giv~n the incentive to settle, once defendants' identifying infor-
mat10n 1s released to the copyright holders, the settlement letters are 
served and defendants overwhelmingly choose to accept the offers. 233 
~llowin~ d~scovery of defendants' identifying information and deferring 
issues of Jomder and personal jurisdiction deprives defendants of an op-
portunity to dispute these matters.234 Findingjoinder of defendants im-
proper helps to prevent copyright holders' goals of mass settlements and 
accords with previous P2P file sharing cases. 235 
230 cr J 1. P . 0ee u ianne ep1tone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for Alleged Illegal 
Downloads, CNN MONEY (June 10, 2011), 
~ttp:/ '.money.cnn.com/2011/06/1 O/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm (collect-
1~g vte~s. of ~ritics who say Voltage's suit is exploitative of copyright law, and refer-
nng to litigation as employing "pay up or we'll getcha" method). 
231 See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (indicating that file-sharers' lawsuits 
typi~ally proceed no further than the release of the defendants' identifying infor-
mat10n and subsequent distribution of settlement letters); see supra notes 9-12 and 
accompanying text. · 
. 
232 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (remitting damages rendered 
agamst P2P file-sharer to $2250 per infringed work, three times the statutory mini-
mum). 
233 cr n· km 0ee 1c an, supra note 23, at 1111 (2008) (indicating that file sharers 
law~uits typically proceed no further than release of defendants' identifying infor-
mation and subsequent distribution of settlement letters). 
234 (1 'd ( . h 0ee l . assertmg t at courts may never resolve procedural questions since 
defendants were unlikely to proceed to trial). 
235 See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of why joinder should be found im-
proper. 
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"President Obama supports responsible, accountable and open 
government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dan-
gerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and clas-
sified documents, WikiLeaks has put at risk not only the cause of hu-
man rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. "1 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 25, 2010 WikiLeaks.org ("WikiLeaks") released almost 
70,000 classified U.S. military documents on to its website, detailing 
American operations in Afghanistan (the "Afghan War Logs"). 2 
While the Afghan War Logs comprised only a small portion of the 
documents released on WikiLeaks during 2010, this leak alone con-
tained the names and addresses of over 117 informants. 3 A hypothet-
ical cable from the Afghan War Logs would read: 
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, awarded Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet Note of the Year, as select-
ed by the Volume 2 Editorial Board. 
1 Press Release, White House, Statement of the Press Secretary, Nov. 28, 
2010, at http ://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11 /28/ statement-press-secretary. 
2 C.J. Chivers et al., The Afghan Struggle: A Secret Archive and an Unvar-
nished Look at a Hamstrung Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at Al. 
3 Larry Love, Here are the Details o/Wikileaks Informants, ABOVE TOP 
SECRET (Jun. 30, 2010, 2:08 PM), 
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread598661/pgl. 
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"HCT4 was notified by local informant Rachel Redacted5 of 
IEDs 6 hidden in a plum orchard in Khost. Orchard belonged 
to Paul Property-Owner, 7 but he was not currently living in 
area. Rachel Redacted has provided information on IEDs at 
least 15 times in the past. Counter-IED Units located all IED 
components buried in plum orchard." 8 
From this cable, Rachel Redacted's identity could easily be dis-
covered with the help of some local knowledge. 9 Providing clues re-
garding the specific identities of U.S. collaborators put these- inform-
ants, their families, and the U.S. troops in the region in harm's way. 10 
Shortly after the Afghan War Logs release, the New York Times re-
ported that the Taliban formed a nine-member commission to create a 
"wanted" list of Afghan informants identified on WikiLeaks. 11 The 
Taliban spokesman added, "[a]fter the process is completed, our Tali-
ban court will decide about such people."12 A Taliban "court" would 
likely sentence suspected informants to a gruesome death. 13 
4 HCT stands for "Human Intelligence Collection Team." U.S. DEP'T OF 
ARMY, Field Manual No. 2-22.3 (34-52), Human Intelligence Collector Operations 
(Sept. 6, 2006) at Glossary 5, available at: 
https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23167-1/FM/2-
22.3/gloss.htm. 
5 Rachel Redacted is a hypothetical informant. I will reference her through 
this note instead of referring to the actual informants listed in the Afghan and Iraq 
War Logs. 
6 JED stands for "Improvised Explosive Device." U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FMI 
3-34.119, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (Sept., 2005) at Chapter 1; U.S. 
MARINE CORPS, MCIP 3-17.01, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (Sept., 2005) at 
Chapter 1, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-34-119-excerpt.pdf. 
. 
7 As with the hypothetical informant, I have further redacted the specific 
owner of the orchard to Paul Property-Owner. 
8 This hypothetical is based closely on an actual cable released on Wik-
iLeaks. To protect the individuals referenced in the actual cable, this Note uses a 
hypothetical. 
9 DAVID LEIGH & LUKE HARDING, THE GUARDIAN, Wn<ILEAK.S: INSIDE 
JULIANASSANGE'SWARONSECRECY 112 (2011) [hereinafter LEIGH] ("[I]twas [clear-
ly] possible to work out identities of informants with the help of some local 
knowledge, and to publish the log might lead to the Taliban executing ... Afghans."). 
10 Id. at 111 ("[We were] worried about the repercussions of publishing these 
names, who could easily be killed by the Taliban or other militant groups if identi-
fied."). 
11 John F. Bums & Ravi Somaiya, Wikileaks Founder on the Run, Trailed by 
Notoriety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 15 [hereinafter Bums & Somaiya] 
12 Id. at Al. 
13 Alissa J. Rubin, Expanding Control, Taliban Refresh Stamp on Afghan 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at A4 [hereinafter Rubin] (quoting Hajji Maitullah 
Khan "Taliban are very harsh to those who have been convicted of spying and those 
who have an affiliation with the government and the foreigners .... People convicted 
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*** 
On the night of March 3, 1993, James Perry, a contract killer, 
murdered Mildred Hom, her quadriplegic son, Trevor, and Trevor's 
nurse, Janice Saunders. 14 Lawrence Hom, ex-husband of Mildred and 
father to Trevor, hired Perry to kill the family so he could inherit Tre-
vor's trust fund. 15 In plotting the murders, Perry followed, step-by-
step, the instructions of the book Hit Man: A Technical Manual for 
Independent Contractors ("Hit Man Handbook"), published by Pala-
din Press ("Paladin"). 16 The victims' families sued Paladin for wrong-
ful death on the theory that Paladin had aided and abetted the murders 
by supplying Perry the training manual. 17 The Fourth Circuit remand-
ed the case for trial, holding that the First Amendment did not prevent 
subjecting the publisher, Paladin, to liability for the wrongful deaths 
of the victims' families. 18 
*** 
Will the Free Speech Clause of The First Amendment19 protect 
WikiLeaks or, like Paladin, could WikiLeaks be subject to liability if 
its publication of the Afghan and Iraq War Logs led to the unlawful 
killing of a U.S. informant or soldier? Both publications add discourse 
to the public debate on issues of criminal activity. Although the vast 
majority of readers will use these publications in a non-violent way2°, 
both publications can facilitate crime by providing information that 
makes it easier for someone to commit a crime. While the judicial 
of such crimes can be beaten up severely .... One man ... was given 500 lashes a 
day for several days."). 
14 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239-42 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998). 
ls Id. 
16 Id. at 242. 
17 Id. at 243. 
18 Id. at 233 (4th Cir. 1997). See Publisher Settles Case Over Killing Manual, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at A27 (reporting that Hit Man publisher Paladin settled 
the lawsuit by agreeing to stop publishing and selling the manual, as well as paying 
the victims' families millions of dollars). 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech .. _ ."). The First Amendment can serve as a defense in both crimi-
nal and civil cases. See generally, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, (2011) (Defend-
ants protesting at Iraqi War Veteran funerals were given immunity from civil liability 
for the tort oflntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under the First Amend-
ment.). 
20 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, at 
1123 n.117 (2005) [hereinafter Volokh] ("In 1983, when Hit Man was published, 
there were only about 20,000 homicides in the U.S ..... It seems likely that very few 
of them are contract killings, and presumably very few of those are contract killings 
by people trained using a particular book."). 
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ed the case for trial, holding that the First Amendment did not prevent 
subjecting the publisher, Paladin, to liability for the wrongful deaths 
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Will the Free Speech Clause of The First Amendment19 protect 
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system must protect freedom of speech, it must also ensure safety to 
those assisting the U.S. in its war efforts. 
The unredacted WikiLeaks cables are damaging to both the U.S. 
informants listed and the overall U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and 
!1"aq. 21 _The Bill of Rights is designed to balance competing interests, 
mclud~g pers?nal liberty, individual safety, and national security. 22 
A wartime envrronment, however, inevitably intensifies this tension. 23 
Throughout American history, the government has restricted public 
discourse in the name of "national security."24 Nevertheless, even in 
~he ~ame_ of national se~~ty25the ~overnment must have a compelling Justification for such llilllts. Ultrmately, the balancing test for the 
freedom of speech is simple: do the benefits of disclosure outweigh its 
costs?26 
When addressing the individual safety of those informants ex-
posed by WikiLeaks, the First Amendment offers protection because 
it_ "does not guarantee an absolute right to anyone, to express their 
views any place, at any time, and in any way they want. "27 For in-
stance, in order to protect our nation, the government may regulate 
spee~h ~hat gives milit~ry advantage to a foreign enemy, 28 or speech 
that 1s likely to cause mdividuals to fear immediate violence. 29 Fur-
thermore, speech_ which poses a risk t~ society and that does not pro-
mote the underlymg values of the First Amendment can be considered 
unprotected speech. 30 
21 Press_ Release, White House, Statement of the Press Secretary (Nov. 28, 
~? 1 O),_ http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/1 I/28/statement-press-secretary 
( President Obama supports responsible, accountable and open government at home 
and arou~d the world, but thi~ reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. 
By releasmg stol~n and classified d?cuments, WikiLeak:s has put at risk not only the 
cause o~~uman nghts but also the hves and work of these individuals."). 
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1209. 
. 
23 E~pionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Raised by WikiLeaks: 
Hearing Serial No. 111-160 Before the H Comm. on the Judiciary, I I I th Cong. I I 
(2010) (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at I3. 
27 Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynsk:i, Jr., Recali-
brating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. 
& MARYL. REV. 1159, 1179 (2000) (quoting Olivieri v. Ward, 801F.2d602 
605 (2d Cir. 1986)). ' 
28 J ENNIFER K. ELSEA, CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF 
CLASSIFIED D~FENSE INFORMATION, CONG. RESEARCH SER., R4I404, at 13 n.80 (Sept. 
8, 20I I)2~heremafter ELSEA]; See also Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 7I6 (193I). 
30 
R.A.V. '!· Ci~ of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (I992). 
See Lon Weiss, Is the True Threats Doctrine Threatening the First 
Amendment? Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American 
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Indeed, the First Amendment protects some speech more than 
others. 31 The Supreme Court has held that truthful information 
3
\hat ~s 
a matter of public concern is the most protected type of s~ee~h. This 
is justified by the Supreme Court's belief t~at the consti~t10na~ pur-
pose behind the guarantee of press freedom 1s to protect free discus-
sion of governmental affairs."33 On the other hand, the Com:: has no~­
ed that it is "obvious and unarguable" that no govemmental mterest 1s 
more compelling than the security of the Nation. 34 Therefore, the 
court must balance the public concern doctrine, which is ·considered 
h 35 • h t' the highest rung of protected speec , ag~mst t e go_vem:nen
36 
s re-
sponsibility t~ protec!
7 
individuals from natl?nal security nsks, _true 
threats of violence, and the over-archmg problem of cnme-
facilitating speech. 38 . 
This note will conclude that ifWikiLeaks is prosecuted for cnmes 
in relation to the leaked documents, it is not immune from civil or 
criminal liability under the First Amendment because the harms creat-
ed by releasing unredacted documents outweigh the public benefit of 
added discourse on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 39 Part II dis-
Coalition of Life Activists Signals the Need to Remed;: an Inadequate J?octrine, 72 
FORDHAM L. REv. I283, 1305 (2004) [hereinafter Weiss]; Watts v. Umted States, 394 
U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam). 
31 ERWIN CHEMERINKSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
93 I (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY] ("The Supren:e 
Court has declared that some types of expression are unprotected and may be prohib-
ited and punished."). 
32 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 5I4, 527 (200I) (quoting Smith v. Daily 
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)) (restriction of"publication of truthful 
information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards."). 
33 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 2I4, 218 (1966). 
34 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 3I8 (198I). 
35 See Snyderv. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
36 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
37 See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
38 See generally Volokh, supra note 20. 
39 WikiLeaks could face prosecution: 
(1) for wrongful death or torture under the Alien Torts_ ~lain:s ~ct.' 2_8 U.S.C. § ~3?0, 
(2006), which reads, "The district courts shall have ongmal JUnsdict10n o! any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of t?e law _of nat10ns or a 
treaty of the United States." This statute is notable for allowmg Umted S~ates cou~s 
to hear human rights cases brought by foreign citizens for conduct committed outside 
the United States.; 
(2) for endangering lives of intelligence personnel under the Intelligence Identities 
Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. § 42I-426, (2006), which is a United States federal law that 
makes it a federal crime for those with access to classified information, or those who 
systematically seek to identify and expose covert agents and hav_e reas_on to believe 
that it will harm the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S, to mtent10nally reveal 
the identity of an agent whom one knows to be in or recently in certain covert roles 
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system must protect freedom of speech, it must also ensure safety to 
those assisting the U.S. in its war efforts. 
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When addressing the individual safety of those informants ex-
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2
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to hear human rights cases brought by foreign citizens for conduct commrtted outside 
the United States.; 
(2) for endangering lives of intelligence personnel under the Intelligence Identities 
Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. § 421-426, (2006), which is a United States federal law that 
makes it a federal crime for those with access to classified information, or those who 
systematically seek to identify and expose covert agents and have reas.on to believe 
that it will harm the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S, to intent10nally reveal 
the identity of an agent whom one knows to be in or recently in certain covert roles 
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~usse~ the WikiLeaks situation by explaining the organization's past, 
mtent10ns, and the released documents. Part III evaluates the First 
~endme_nt' s public concern doctrine. Part IV discusses three excep-
t~ons to Frrst Amendment immunity: (1) the national security excep-
tion; (2) the true threats doctrine; and (3) the umbrella of crime-
facilita~g speech. Part V lays out a balancing test for assessing when 
speech 1s unprotected by the First Amendment in regard to its value to 
society and the harm created under the national security exception, the 
true threats doctrine, and crime-facilitation. Part VI concludes that 
WikiLeaks will not be protected by First Amendment immunity if 
prosecuted for harm to U.S. informants or soldiers because it does not 
pass the balancing test. 
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON WIKILEAKS 
40 
"They called me the James Bond of journalism, " - Julian Assan-
ge 
WikiLeaks is a whistle-blowing website that provides an anony-
mo_us ;vay ~or ~our~es to l~ak information to joumalists.41 The organi-
zat10n s O~J~ctlve is_ to ~2nng transparency to both private and public 
sector dec1s10n-making. In 2010, many of the publications released 
by WikiLeaks were classified U.S. military and diplomatic cables.43 
This caused many government officials to wonder if the U.S. govern-
ment can, or should, try to limit WikiLeaks' freedom of speech in the 
name of national security. 44 
with a U.S. intelligence agency, unless the United States has publicly acknowledged 
or revealed the relationship; or 
(3) un~e~ The Espio~age Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793, (2011), which prohibits the gathering, 
transrmtting, or receipt of defense information with the intent or reason to believe the 
informa~i0on will be used against the United States or to the benefit of a foreign nation. Bums & Somaiya supra note 11. 
41 WIIULEAKS WIKILEAKS.ORG, 
http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:About (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) [herein-
after, WnaLEAKS.ORG]. 
42 Id. 
43 ELSEA, supra note 28, at 1. 
. 
44 
Id at 13 (noting that the Attorney General has reportedly stated that the 
Justice _Department and Department of Defense are investigating the circumstances to 
determme whether any prosecutions will be undertaken in connection with the disclo-
sure). 
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A. What is WikiLeaks? 
WikiLeaks is a website that was founded in 2007 by a group of 
government-transparency activists and Julian Assang~, a 39-ye~r-old 
Australian. 45 Assange "used years of computer hacking expenence, 
and what friends call a near genius I.Q.," to establish WikiLeaks and 
redefine whistle-blowing. 46 WikiLeaks operates as a non-profit organ-
ization, with very small operating expenses and no paid salaries for its 
staff members including Assange. 47 WikiLeaks argues that, because 
they are not m~tivated by making money, it is easier to coo~erate with 
other publishing and media organizations around the globe m order to 
attract as much attention as possible. 48 The organization does this by 
making the original documents available so that readers can verify the 
49 . 
source documents. 
Before publication, WikiLeaks ensures that documents are genu-
ine by conducting a forensic analysis of the materi~l to detei:m~e t~~ 
cost of forgery and claims of the apparent authonng orgamzat10n .. 
Additionally, WikiLeaks outsources verification analysis to media 
organizations like the New York Times (U.S.), The Guardian (U.K.) 
and Der Spiegel (Germany). In the case of the Afghan and Iraq War 
Logs, these three prominent newspapers were given copies ~f. the ca-
bles months before their release on WikiLeaks, on the condition that 
all of the organizations coordinated the release date. 51 The simult~ne­
ous publication sparked worldwide attention and allowed _the publish-
ers to focus on specific stories to target a broader readership. 
To understand the legal quandary WikiLeaks presents, it is vital to 
know how the website functions. WikiLeaks promises protection for 
its sources and claims that the website "provides a high security anon-
ymous drop box fortified by cutting-edge cryptographic techn~lo-
gies."52 The organization operates a number of servers across multiple 
· 1 . th 53 international jurisdictions and anonymity occurs ear y m e process. 
WikiLeaks obscures submissions in junk data, then routes them 
through servers in Sweden, Belgium, and Iceland-countries with 
45 Wild Gaga: No Technology Can Protect Whistle-Blowers from Them-
selves, THE ECONOMIST (June 10, 2010) http://www.economist.com/node/16335810. 
46 Bums & Somaiya supra note 11. , 
47 Kim Zetter, Wikileaks Cash Flows in, Drips Out, WIRED (July 12, 2010) 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07 /wikileaks-funding. 
48 WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 41. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 LEIGH supra note 9, at 11 7. 
52 WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 41. 
53 Id. 
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46 Bums & Somaiya supra note 11. , 
47 Kim Zetter, Wikileaks Cash Flows in, Drips Out, WIRED (July 12, 2010) 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07 /wikileaks-funding. 
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51 LEIGH supra note 9, at 117. 
52 WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 41. 
53 Id. 
372 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:2] 
strict laws protecting journalists and the disclosure of confidential 
sources. 54 As a result, WikiLeaks calls itself "multi-jurisdictional"55 
because it is nearly impossible for a single government to force a doc-
ument's removal from its servers. 56 
WikiLeaks' technology operates on a Tor network. 57 The creation 
of a Tor network is the key to WikiLeaks' security because only the 
first proxy server, the entry node, ever communicates directly with the 
user. 58 The first server relays the documents to the second, the second 
to the third, and so on. In the end, the system prevents any one node 
from being able to trace activity back to the original user. 59 The sys-
tem began small, but WikiLeaks' network now encompasses over 700 
servers around the world60 and shutting down the network by legal 
means would be complex because there is no central authority. 61 
Therefore, while a court order in one country may impact several 
servers, the removal of a substantial portion of WikiLeaks servers 
would require multinational cooperation. 62 
Any efforts by the U.S. government to interdict WikiLeaks 
through an injunction would likely have almost no effect on the or-
ganization. 63 In 2008, a Switzerland-based bank sued WikiLeaks after 
WikiLeaks published documents that demonstrated the bank's com-
plicity in tax evasion.64 A U.S. federal district court judge issued an 
injunction, but WikiLeaks simply moved to a new domain name, with 
54 Wild Gaga: No Technology Can Protect Whistle-Blowers from Them-
selves, THE ECONOMIST (June 10, 2010) http://www.economist.com/node/16335810 
(in Sweden it is a crime to disclose a source, in Belgium a wiretapped conversation 
with a journalist is inadmissible in court, and in Iceland Assange has worked with 
legislators to draft tough free-speech laws). 
55 Id. 
56 See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (District Court declined to uphold an injunction against WikiLeaks' publication 
of secret bank records). 
57 WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 41. 
58 Richard Abbott, An Onion a Day Keeps the NSA Away, 13 No. 11 J. 
lNTERNETL. 22, 32 (2010). 
59 Id. 
60 Dealing with WikiLeaks: The Right Reaction, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 9, 
2010) http://www.economist.com/node/17677820. 
61 Abbott, supra note 58, at 26. 
62 Id. 
63 Derek E. Bambauer, Consider the Censor, Brooklyn Law School Studies 
Research Papers, Accepted Paper Series, No. 218 (Feb. 2011) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 757890 [hereinafter Bambauer]. 
64 See Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd. V. Wikileaks, Case No. 3:2008cv00824 
(N.D. Cal. 2008), available at 
http://dockets.justia.com/ docket/ california/ candce/3:2008cv00824/200125/. 
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the documents still available to searchers. 65 Admitting defeat, the 
judge dissolved the injunction two weeks after instituting it. 66 This 
demonstrates how easily WikiLeaks can manipulate its organization 
and information beyond the control of hostile judicial regimes. 67 
Furthermore, States have not been successful shutting down Wik-
iLeaks through software code rather than legal measures. 68 The organ-
ization survived both a massive denial of service attack69 and the 
withdrawal of hosting services. 70 Even authoritarian regimes have 
been unable to tame the organization's power completely71 because 
WikiLeaks is designed to exist beyond the reach of any single gov-
ernment. 72 Therefore, governments should be wary of any efforts to 
enjoin WikiLeaks and prosecution must be done post-facto, which 
may deter similar organizations from publishing harmful infor-
mation.73 
B. What Has WikiLeaks Done? 
WikiLeaks published classified information long before 2010.
74 
Yet, the first time the organization captured international media atten-
tion was on April 5, 2010, with the release of a 38-minute clip of 
cockpit video from a 2007 air strike by an American Apache helicop-
2008). 
65 Id. 
66 See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 
67 See Bambauer, supra note 63, at 5. 
68 Id. at 6. 
69 Id. (citing Gregg Keizer, DoS attacks hammer WikiLeaks for second day 
running, COMPUTERWORLD, (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9198679/DoS_attacks_hammer_ WikiLeaks 
_for_second_day_running) (allegedly launched by a hacker sympathetic to the U.S. 
government). 
70 See Bambauer, supra note 63, at 6 (citing Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon 
Says WikiLeaks Violated Terms of Service, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2010), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703377504575651321402763304.ht 
ml). 
71 Bambauer, supra note 63, at 6. 
72 Id. at 7. 
73 Eric Sterner, WikiLeaks and Cyberspace Cultures in Conflict, THE GEORGE 
C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE 3 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter, Sterner] ("Wikileaks represents a 
growing trend that will undermine the long-term utility of the internet for commerce 
and governance."). 
74 Matt Warman, WikiLeaks: Top 5 Leaks, THE TELEGRAPH, (Feb. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/7128244/WikiLeaks-Top-
5-leaks.html (Some notable leaks included documents on: Guantanamo Bay detention 
operation, the contents of Sarah Palin's personal Yahoo email account, and the mem-
bership rolls of the neo-Nazi British National Party). 
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enjoin WikiLeaks and prosecution must be done post-facto, which 
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Yet, the first time the organization captured international media atten-
tion was on April 5, 2010, with the release of a 38-minute clip of 
cockpit video from a 2007 air strike by an American Apache helicop-
2008). 
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73 Eric Sterner, WikiLeaks and Cyberspace Cultures in Conflict, THE GEORGE 
C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE 3 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter, Sterner] ("Wikileaks represents a 
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74 Matt Warman, WikiLeaks: Top 5 Leaks, THE TELEGRAPH, (Feb. 1, 2010), 
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ter in Baghdad. 75 The video showed the helicopter gunning down at 
least 12 people, including two civilians later identified as Reuters 
journalists. 76 Specialist Bradley Manning, a 22-year-old Army intelli-
gence analyst, was arrested for disclosure of the helicopter footage. 
He later confessed that he had also given over 260,000 classified doc-
uments to WikiLeaks. 77 
The next noteworthy WikiLeaks release occurred on July 25, 
2010, when the organization disclosed approximately 77,000 individ-
ual classified war logs from the U.S. military in Afghanistan. 78 The 
Afghan War Logs contained reports used by desk officers in the Pen-
t~gon. and tr~ops in the field to mak~9 operational plans and prepare ~1tuat10nal bnefings on the war zone. Most of the reports contained 
~ ~he Afghan War Logs are routine, even mundane, but they added 
m~1~ht, texture, and context to the nine-year war effort. 80 Days later, 
WikiLeaks released 15,000 additional classified documents which 
were held for minor redactions. 81 By the end of this wave of releases 
WikiLeaks had posted 92,201records. 82 ' 
The release was met with mixed reaction. Many praised Wik-
iLeaks, including Daniel Ellsberg, the man who leaked the Pentagon 
Pa~~rs to the New York Times in 1971. Ellsberg said, "I've been 
wa1tmg 40 years for someone to disclose information on a scale that 
might really make a difference."83 Others remained apathetic to the 
real substance of the leaked material. As The Economist stated "the 
diary seems to be long on details, but short on revelations." 84 Sirilar-
ly, President Obama stated that the information was old and thus did 
not reflect current realities. 85 
75 LEIGH, supra note 9, at 70. 
76 Eric Schmidt, In Disclosing Secrets, Wikileaks Seeks 'Transparency,' N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 20 l 0, at All. 
77 Elizabeth Bumiller, Army Leak Suspect is Turned in, by Ex-Hacker, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at Al. 
78 LEIGH, supra note 9, at 116. 
79 Afghanistan: Don't Go Back, THE ECONOMIST (July 29, 20 l 0) 
http://www.economist.com/node/166933 l 3. 
80 A Note to Readers: Piecing Together the Reports and Deciding What to 
Publish, N.Y.TIMEs, July 26 2010 at A8. 
81 . , 
Sarah C. Sulhvan, A Closer Look at Wikileaks' Past, Future, PBS 
NEWSHOUSE (July 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/july-dec 1 O/wikileaks 07-26.html. 
~M -
83 Bums & Somaiya supra note 11. 
84 Afghanistan: Don't Go Back, THE ECONOMIST (July 29, 20 l 0) 
http://www.economist.com/node/166933 l 3. 
85 John O'Loughlin et al., Peering into the Fog of War: The Geography of 
the WikiLeaks Afghanistan War Logs, 2004-2009, EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECON 
473 (2010). 
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However, many were quick to condemn the disclosures, including 
top U.S. officials who accused WikiLeaks of risking the lives of Af-
ghan informants. 86 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates claimed, "the 
battlefield consequences are potentially severe and dangerous for our 
troops our allies and Afghan partners, and may well damage our rela-
tionships and reputation in that key part of the world."
87 
Admiral 
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "Mr. Assan-
ge can say whatever he likes about the greater good . . . but the truth 
is, [WikiLeaks] might already have on their hands the blood of some 
young soldier or that of an Afghan family." 88 
Along with the U.S. military commanders, a coalition of human-
rights groups 89 critic~zed Assan~; for ~~iling to re~~ct the names ~n~ 
locations of Afghan mformants. Add1t10nally, WikiLeaks drew cnt1-
cism from journalists and scholars, who have contrasted WikiLeaks' 
wide-ranging disclosure with the more measured approach taken by 
the media outlets that received early access to the documents. 
91 
Assange responded via Twitter, suggesting that human-rights groups 
had refused to help WikiLeaks in redacting the documents. 
92 
He also 
blamed the U.S. military for putting its own Afghan sources at risk: 
"[t]his material was available to every soldier and contractor in Af-
86 Id. 
87 David Leigh, Wikileaks 'has blood on its hands' over Afghan War Logs, 
Claim U.S. Officials, THE GUARDIAN, July 31, 2010, at p.9 of the Main section. 
88 Id. (Admiral Mullen was speaking to the fact that some of the released 
documents included the names, villages, and families of informants in Afghanistan). 
89 Eben Harrell, Wikileaks Comes Under Fire from Rights Groups, TIME, 
Aug. 12, 2010, available at . 
http://www. time.come/time/world/ article/O ,8599,20103 09 ,00 .html (groups mcluded 
Amnesty International, the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, the Open 
Society Institute, and Reporters Without Borders). 
90 Id.; See also Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim 
Federal Reporter's Privilege in Any Form, 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 667, 684 (2011), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_peters/l [hereinafter Peters] (refer-
encing the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics whic~ states, under the 
subhead "Minimize Harm," "Journalists should ... show compass10n for those who 
may be affected by news coverage ... [and] recognize that gathe~g and reporting 
information may cause harm or discomfort ... pursuit of the news ts not a ltcense for 
arrogance."). 
91 See Bambauer, supra note 63, at 8. 
92 Philip Shenon, U.S. Urges Allies to Crack Down on Wikileaks, ~HE DAILY 
BEAST, Aug. 10, 2010, available at http://thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stones/2010-
08-1 O/a-westem-crackdown-on-wikileaks/ (citing Assange's Twitter post: "Pentagon 
wants to bankrupt us by refusing to assist review. Media won't take responsibility. 
Amnesty won't. What to do?"). 
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WikiLeaks released 15,000 additional classified documents which 
were held for minor redactions. 81 By the end of this wave of releases 
WikiLeaks had posted 92,201 records. 82 ' 
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iLeaks, mcludmg Daniel Ellsberg, the man who leaked the Pentagon 
Pa~~rs to the New York Times in 1971. Ellsberg said, "I've been 
waitmg 40 years for someone to disclose information on a scale that 
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However, many were quick to condemn the disclosures, including 
top U.S. officials who accused WikiLeaks of risking the lives of Af-
ghan informants. 86 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates claimed, "the 
battlefield consequences are potentially severe and dangerous for our 
troops, our allies and Afghan partners, and may well damage our r~la­
tionships and reputation in that key part of the world."
87 
Admiral 
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "Mr. Assan-
ge can say whatever he likes about the greater good . . . but the truth 
is, [WikiLeaks] might already have on their hands the blood of some 
young soldier or that of an Afghan family." 88 
Along with the U.S. military commanders, a coalition of human-
rights groups 89 criticized Assange for failing to redact the names and 
locations of Afghan informants.90 Additionally, WikiLeaks drew criti-
cism from journalists and scholars, who have contrasted WikiLeaks' 
wide-ranging disclosure with the more measured approach taken by 
the media outlets that received early access to the documents.
91 
Assange responded via Twitter, suggesting that human-rights groups 
had refused to help WikiLeaks in redacting the documents. 92 He also 
blamed the U.S. military for putting its own Afghan sources at risk: 
"[t]his material was available to every soldier and contractor in Af-
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87 David Leigh, Wikileaks 'has blood on its hands' over Afghan War Logs, 
Claim U.S. Officials, THE GUARDIAN, July 31, 2010, at p.9 of the Main section. 
88 Id. (Admiral Mullen was speaking to the fact that some of the released 
documents included the names, villages, and families of informants in Afghanistan). 
89 Eben Harrell, Wikileaks Comes Under Fire from Rights Groups, TIME, 
Aug. 12, 2010, available at . 
http://www.time.come/time/world/article/0,8599,2010309,00.html (groups mcluded 
Amnesty International, the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, the Open 
Society Institute, and Reporters Without Borders). 
90 Id.; See also Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim 
Federal Reporter's Privilege in Any Form, 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 667, 684 (2011), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_peters/1 [hereinafter Peters] (refer-
encing the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics whic~ states, under the 
subhead "Minimize Harm," "Journalists should ... show compass10n for those who 
may be affected by news coverage ... [and] recognize that gathering and reporting 
information may cause harm or discomfort ... pursuit of the news is not a license for 
arrogance."). 
91 See Bambauer, supra note 63, at 8. 
92 Philip Shenon, U.S. Urges Allies to Crack Down on Wikileaks, ~HE DAILY 
BEAST, Aug. 1 O, 2010, available at http://thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stones/2010-
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~hanistan_. ·: it's the U.S. military that deserves the blame for not giv-
mg due diligence to its informers. "93 
In October 2010, WikiLeaks released a cache of almost 400 000 
classified documents known as the "Iraq War Logs."94 Similar t~ the 
Afghan War Logs, the classified documents were daily war efforts 
recorded by U.S. so~di~r~ ?n the ground. The Iraq War Logs cataloged 
the number of Iraqi civilians that died, many at the hands of other 
Iraqis. 95 In the Iraq War Logs, WikiLeaks appeared to be making an 
effort to minimize the risk to civilians96 by developing an algorithm to 
e:ase names and locations of persons listed. 97 Unfortunately, the algo-
nthm system was not foolproof and the U.S. government identified 
the names of at least 300 Iraqis who were believed to be "particularly 
vulnerable in light of this exposure."98 
Finally, on November 30, 2010, WikiLeaks released over four 
deca.des of U.S. diplomatic cables that originated from 274 U.S. em-
bassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions. 99 This time, Assange 
aske1
00
the U.S. government to help redact the secret diplomatic ca-
bles.. !he State Department refused to cooperate, stating that the 
pubhcatton of classified material violates U.S. law and therefore it 
·ir . 101 ' 
was unwi mg to . assist WikiLeaks. In response, Assange accused 
the U.S. of adopting a confrontational stance and indicated his intent 
to publis~ the mate?~I with or without assistance in redacting. 102 Un-
able to dissuade WikiLeaks from leaking the cables, the White House 
released a statement on November 28, 201 O to mitigate potential out-
at 11. 
93 
WikiLeaker rejects blood-on-hands claim, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 2, 2010, 
94 LEIGH, supra note 9 at 128. 
95 Id. at 131. ' 
96 Peters, supra note 90, at 685. 
97 Je~Bercovici, In Growing Up, Did Wikileaks Also Sell Out? FORBES (Oct. 
25, 2010), available at http://blogs.forbes.com/jeffbercovici/2010/10/25/in-growing-
up-did-wikileaks-also-sell-out. . 
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CNN, Oct. 22, 2010, available at ' 
http://edition.~nn;~oi:w~OlO!US/10/22/wiki.leaks.iraq/. See also Bambauer, supra note 
63, at 8. ( quotmg ~ikiLeaks has not descnbed the criteria it uses to determine what 
to pub~1sh, nor that 1t uses to redact (if at all) information that creates risk without 
o~s~tting ~enefi~. The s!te does not ~ven reveal who makes those decisions. Hence, 
WikiLeak.s s _claim that Better scrutmy leads to reduced corruption and stronger 
democr~~1es mall society's institutions' evidently does not apply to the site itself"). 
WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra at note 41. 
100
. Letters Between WikiLeaks and the U.S. Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26 
2010, available at http://documents.nytimes.com/letters-between-wikileaks-and-gov 
101 Id. at 2. . 
102 Id at 4. 
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cry and condemn the release. 103 Days later, Attorney General Eric H. 
Holder Jr. stated that the Justice Department and the Pentagon were 
conducting "an active, ongoing criminal investigation" into involve-
. h . t" 104 ment with t e orgamza ton. . 
The release of the diplomatic cables 105 had a much larger impact 
on the Obama administration than the Afghan and Iraq War Logs :e-
lease. The first installment contained 220 cables, only some of which 
were redacted to protect diplomatic sources. 106 Mostly, the do~uments 
contained many obvious revelations spelled out by U.S. diplomats 
around the world. 107 State Department officials privately told Con-
gress that they expected overall damage to ~.S. foreign P?licy to be 
containable. 108 Nevertheless, the leaks contamed a few nattonal s~cu­
rity risks including a long list of commercial and private installat10ns 
' · · . 
109 Th 1 f deemed critical to Amenca's nat10nal secunty. ese reve a tons, 
103 Press Release, White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (Nov. 28, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/11/28/statement-press-secretary. . 
104 Ellen Nakashima & JerryMakron, Wikileaks Founder Could Be Trzed 
Under Espionage Act, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/ content/ article/2010/11 /29/ AR2010112905 973 .html. 
105 Secret U.S. Embassy Cables, WIKILEAKS.ORG, 
http://wikileaks.org/cablegate.html# (last visited Jan. 5: ~012) (the December release 
of the diplomatic cable was dubbed "Cablegate" by W1kiLeaks). 
106 ELSEA, supra note 28, at 2; See also Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, . 
Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010.:_av~zl­
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1 l/29/wor1~29cables.html?pagewanted-all, 
Glenn Kessler, Cables reveal intricacies of U.S. diplomacy, WASH. POST., Nov. 29, 
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/ content/ article/2010/ 11 /28/ AR20101128042_7 8 _ 2.html. 
107 Examples include statements suggestmg that: 
(1) Iran is a growing threat in the Middle East, (What WikiLeaks Revealed: from 
Soporific to Sizzling, ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2010) 
http://www.economist.com/node/17632855_); and, . , . 
(2)Valdamir Putin is still in charge of Russia followmg Medvedev s accession t? 
power. (Massimo Calabresi, Wiki Dump: Why More Secrecy Means Less Security, 
TIME (Nov. 29, 2010), available at " . . http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,2033411:00.h~l ( Amei:ican ~Ip-
lomat believes Russian president Dmitry Medvedev plays Rohm to [Russian Pnme 
Minister Vladimir] Putin's Batman."')). . . 
108 Mark Hosenball, US Officials Privately Say WikiLeaks Damage Lzmzted, 
REUTERS, (Jan. 18, 2011), available at .. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/201 l/Ol/18/wikileaks-damage-
idUSN1816319120110118. 
109 More Dope, No Highs, ECONOMIST, (Dec. 9, 2010) . 
http://www.economist.com/node/l 7674097 (quot~g th~ list "in~luded the !andmg 
points of undersea cables, the names of firms makmg vital vaccmes; and big ports. 
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along with often embarrassing comments by U.S. diplomats, undoubt-
edly had an impact on U.S. diplomatic relationships around the 
world. 110 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the release as an 
attack on the U.S. and the entire international diplomatic communi-
ty.111 
II. THE RIGHT TO DISCLOSE MATTERS OF "PUBLIC 
CONCERN" 
The Supreme Court stalwartly protects speech when it involves 
"public issues" such as "economic, social, and political subjects."112 
Furthermore, the Court considers speech on public concerns to be on 
the "highest rung" of constitutional protection, and "at the heart of the 
First Amendment."113 The Supreme Court has never clearly defined 
the difference between matters of public concern and those of mere 
. t 114 Wh.l b h . pnva e concern. 1 e ot categones of speech are protected un-
der the First Amendment, speech on matters of private concern, which 
have little social value, are accorded less protection than speech on 
matters that affect the public at large. 115 The Supreme Court reasons 
that restricting speech on purely private issues does not implicate the 
same constitutional concerns as limitations to speech on matters of 
public interest. 116 
One possible definition of public concern would include any 
speech that is relevant to any political, social, or scientific controver-
sy. The Supreme Court took this view in Florida Star v. B.JF., where 
it concluded that the name of a rape victim was a matter of "public 
significance" because of its connection to a reported crime, and there-
But the list had obvious omissions and nothing on it was secret. Published on the 
Pentagon's website it would hardly have raised an eyebrow."). 
110 Glenn Kessler, Cables reveal intricacies of US. diplomacy, WASH. POST. 
(Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR2010112804278 2.html. 
111 Ewen MacAskill, Hillary Clinton Attack Release of US. Embassy Cables, 
GUARDIAN, (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://~.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/clinton-reacts-us-embassy-cables. 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980). 
113 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011)(quoting Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)). 
114 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1166. 
115 See Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Farwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
. 
116 Synder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215-16 ("That is because restricting speech on pure-
ly pnvate matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting 
speech on matters of public interest: '[T]here is no threat to the free and robust debate 
of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ide-
as."' (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760.)). 
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fore publishing the name was fully protected speech. 117 Only Justice 
Scalia's solo concurrence in Florida Star acknowledged that this in-
formation may be considered private, since a ban on publishing the 
name of rape victims might be justified as a means of preventing fur-
ther attacks aimed at intimidating or silencing the victim. 118 Under the 
Court's approach in Florida Star, only a few topics would qualify as 
private concerns that may justify limitations on speech. 
Another example of the Supreme Court applying a sweeping defi-
nition of the public concern doctrine is in Bartnicki, where an un-
known person illegally taped a telephone conversation between Gloria 
Bartnicki, an employee of the Pennsylvania Educators' Association, 
and the President of the local teachers' union. 119 The tape was later 
given to Vopper, a local radio host who played it on air. 120 Bartnicki 
brought suit against Vopper for civil damages. 121 The Court held that 
the media was generally free to publish material on matters of public 
concern, even if it was drawn from telephone conversations that were 
illegally gathered by third parties. 122 Overall, Bartnicki limits the pri-
vacy rights of individuals when there is an issue of public signifi-
cance even those as trivial as the activities of a local teachers' un-, 
. 123 
I On. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's definition of a private con-
cern is less clear than its definition of a public concern. In Dun & 
Bradstreet, the Supreme Court provided an example of private speech 
when it held that information about a particular individual's credit 
bl. . "124 b th h " 1 1 . report "concerns no pu 1c ISsue ecause e speec was so e y Ill 
d . "fi d" ,,125 the individual interest of the speaker an its spec1 1c au 1ence. 
This conclusion was supported by the fact that the particular report 
was sent to only five subscribers by the reporting service, all of whom 
d d. . . furth 126 were boun to not 1ssemmate 1t er. 
Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires 
the Court to examine the "content, form, and context" of that speech, 
117 Florida Starv. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-37 (1981). 
118 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
119 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001). 
120 Id. at 519. 
121 Bartnicki v. Vopper (Bartnicki II), 200 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(plaintiffs brought civil damages under Federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping acts). 
122 Bartnicld, 532 U.S. at 533. 
123 Id. at 536 ("[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the inter-
est in publishing matters of public importance."). 
124 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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the individual interest of the speaker and its specific audience."
125 
This conclusion was supported by the fact that the particular report 
was sent to only five subscribers by the reporting service, all of whom 
d d. . . furth 126 were boun to not 1ssemmate 1t er. 
Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires 
the Court to examine the "content, form, and context" of that speech, 
117 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-37 (1981). 
118 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
119 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001). 
120 Id. at 519. 
121 Bartnicki v. Vopper (Bartnicki II), 200 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(plaintiffs brought civil damages under Federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping acts). 
122 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533. 
123 Id. at 536 ("[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the inter-
est in publishing matters of public importance."). 
124 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. 
12s Id. 
126 Id. 
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"as revealed by the whole record." 127 "As in other First Amendment 
cases, the court is obligated to 'make an independent examination of 
the whole record"' to insure that, "the judgment does not constitute a 
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." 128 In considering 
content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary 
to evaluate the circumstances of the speech. If the judge concludes 
that the speech is a matter of public concern it is entitled to "special 
t ti. " d h F" Am 129 pro ec on un er t e rrst endment. In summary, if speech re-
lates to a matter of political or social controversy it is a matter of pub-
lic concern. But speech, even political speech, can be private speech if 
it does not add to the public discourse and is solely in the interest of 
the speaker and his intended audience. 
If the speech is within this broad category of public concern, "the 
publication of truthful information that is lawfully acquired enjoys 
considerable First Amendment protection."130 In Florida Star, the 
Supreme Court tried to limit this protection by refusing to hold- that 
"truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First 
Amendment." 131 The Court found that persons could be held liable for 
such speech, but only if there was an interest of the highest order. 132 
Even in Bartnicki, where the information was illegally obtained, the 
Court held that the press is protected so long as it did not participate in 
th ·11 1 . . 133 e 1 ega mtercept10n. In conclusion, the freedom of speech and 
press outweigh most privacy and security interests. 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY EXCEPTIONS 
Speech on war efforts and government activities is at the heart of 
First Amendment protections as defined in the public concern doc-
trin. 134 H th . · e. owever, ere are except10ns to Frrst Amendment law that 
allow the speaker's constitutional immunities to be waived in extreme 
circumstances. Three exceptions are discussed below: national securi-
ty concerns, the true threats doctrine, and crime-facilitating speech. 
:~; Snyder, 131 S. C~. at 1211 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761). 
Id at 1216 (quotmg Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 
Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984)). 
129 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
130 
ELSEA, supra note 28, at 19. 
131 
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1981). 
132 Id. at 541. 
133 B . ki 
artnIC v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) ("We think it clear ... that 
a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield 
from speech about a matter of public concern."). 
134 See supra, Part III. 
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A. The National Security Exception 
When including the First Amendment, the drafters of the Consti-
tution wanted to protect the public's right to discuss government af-
fairs openly. 135 Yet, during the drafting of the Constitution, there was 
a group of dissenters who did not want the press to have broad author-
ity to publish government information such as "military operations or 
affairs of great consequences."136 This argument has evolved into the 
. 1 . t" t fr h 137 nat10na secunty excep 10n o ee speec . 
1. The National Security Exception as Provided in Near 
v. Minnesota 
The national security exception was further developed in 1931, in 
Near v. Minnesota. In Near, the Defendant was charged under a Min-
nesota statute that provided for the abatement of his newspaper as a 
public nuisance 138 because he often accused politicians and police 
officers of conspiring with Jewish gangs. 139 The Supreme Court 
struck down the statute and held that any judicial orders preventing 
h . " . tr . t "140 speec constitute a pnor res am . 
A prior restraint, by defmition, is an immediate and irreversible 
sanction that freezes speech for a time period specified by the gov-
ernment.141 In the context of the freedom of speech, prior restraints 
are considered "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on 
First Amendment rights." 142 Therefore, it is helpful to study the na-
tional security exception in prior restraint cases because they place a 
heavy burden on the government to prove a national security risk. 
In Near, the Supreme Court also crafted an exception for prior re-
straints, holding that prior restraints are constitutional "in exceptional 
cases" including preventing "actual obstructions to [government] re-
cruiting service[s], or the publication of the sailing dates of transports, 
or the number and location of troops." 143 The Court did not explain 
135 Kate Kovarovic, When the Nation Springs a [Wiki]Leak: The "National 
Security" Attack on Free Speech, 14 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 273, at 273 (2011) [herein-
after Kovarovic]. 
136 Id. at 273-74. 
137 Id. at 274. 
138 Nearv. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 701 (1931). 
139 Id. at 704. 
140 Id at 732. 
141 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
142 Id 
143 Near, 238 U.S. at 716. 
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the scope of this exception or if it reached beyond threats to national 
security, 144 but this statement has been frequently upheld. 
2. The Pentagon Papers and the Evolution of the Nation-
al Security Exception 
A famous application of the national security exception is in New 
York Times Co. v. United States, commonly referred to as the "Penta-
gon Papers" case. 145 The "Pentagon Papers" referred to a report, 
commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, entitled 
"History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy, 1945-
1967."146 The report, containing over 7,000 pages on America's activ-
ities in Vietnam, detailed illicit covert actions and the deliberate with-
holding of pertinent information from the American public. 147 The 
Supreme Court decided the high profile case only eighteen days after 
the first installment appeared in the New York Times. 148 
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion contained only three 
paragraphs and simply stated that the government faces an extremely 
high burden in seeking prior restraints, a burden the government failed 
to meet. 149 Joined by six Justices, the ruling denied the injunction. 150 
Yet, each Justice balanced national security and freedom of speech a 
little differently. Although the Pentagon Papers case established little 
legal precedent, the opinions provide significant insight into the na-
tional security exception to the First Amendment. 151 
First, Justice Stewart's opinion created the test for future national 
security exception cases. He held that disclosure of classified infor-
mation is only prohibited when the publication will "surely result in 
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its peo-
ple." 152 Furthermore, he acknowledged that Congress could enact 
"specific and appropriate criminal laws to protect government proper-
ty and preserve government secrets."153 Ultimately, Justice Stewart 
agreed with the majority, but gave deference to national security; 
144 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1129. 
145 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
146 Judson 0. Littleton, Eliminating Public Disclosures of Government Infor-
mation from the Reach of the Espionage Act, 86 Tux. L. REv. 889, 892 (2008). 
147 Id. 
ed). 
148 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 958. 
149 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 713. 
150 Id. 
151 Kovarovic, supra note 135, at 288. 
152 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis add-
153 Id. 
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On the other hand, Justices Black and Douglas held that prior re-
straints are never allowed to protect national security interests. Justice 
Black asserted that the Government has no power to censor the press 
154 s· ·1 1 J . D because the press censors the Government. nm ar y, ustlce oug-
las stated that the press must act vigilantly to unearth government 
corruption. 155 He argued that secrecy in government is fundamentally 
anti-democratic and open discussion of public policy is vital to our 
national health. 156 
The other Justices put more weight on the side of national securi-
ty. Justice Brennan argued that, in this case, the attempt to enjoin pub-
lication of the Pentagon Papers fell short of the high standard needed 
for a prior restraint. In the future, however, he believed that there may 
be a national security dilemma that could allow an injunction of pub-
lication. 157 Justice Brennan proposed that prior restraints should only 
be allowed when the government has proof that the publication will 
"inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an 
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea."158 
Next, Justice White looked to the Legislative branch to deal with 
the problem. 159 He concluded that Congress has not addressed the 
issue of preemptively limiting free speech in the name of national 
security. 160 Therefore, Congress must rely on the deterrent effect of 
criminal sanctions on an irresponsible press and not on prior re-
straints. 161 Analogously, Justice Marshall looked to find a statute un-
der which Congress had given the Executive the power to stop the 
publication, but determined that Congress had specifically rejected 
154 Id. at 717 (Black, J. concurring) (arguing, duty of the free press is "to 
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to 
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell."). 
155 Id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he impairment of the ... security 
of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary 
need of a vigilant and courageous press") (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 
719-20 (1931)). 
156 Id. at 724. 
157 Id. at 724-725 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[O]ur judgments in the present 
cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary 
stays and restraining orders to block the publication of materials sought to be sup-
pressed by the Government."). 
158 Id. at 728. 
159 Id. at 740 (White, J. concurring) (focusing on the application of the Espio-
nage Act of 1917). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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passing legislation that would give the President the power to enjoin 
the New York Times. 162 
The three dissenters uniformly expressed dissatisfaction with the 
haste in which the Court decided the case and gave more weight to 
national security than to the First Amendment. Justice Harlan, writing 
for the dissent, held that the Judiciary should stay out of this matter 
because the decision was one of foreign policy, which is clearly with-
in the scope of the Executive. 163 He argued that this decision is for the' 
political departments of the government, the Executive and Legisla-
tive, stating, "[the decision is] delicate, complex, and involve[s] large 
elements of prophecy [which] ... should be undertaken only by those 
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or im-
peril." 164 
In conclusion, the case is not as concrete as many perceive it to 
be. Only two Justices gave an unequivocal right of expression to the 
First Amendment. 165 Importantly, seven of the nine Justices acknowl-
edged the existence and power of the national security exception. 
3. Contemporary Approaches and Application of 
the Direct, Immediate and Irreparable Test 
Shortly after the Pentagon Papers case, the dilemma of prior re-
straints was raised again in United States v. Progressive, where a fed-
eral district court issued an injunction to keep a magazine from pub-
lishing an article on how to build a hydrogen bomb. 166 The court bal-
anced the freedom of speech against national security, stating: "few 
things, save grave national security concerns, are sufficient to override 
First Amendment interests ... [and yet, we are also] convinced that 
the government has a right to classify certain sensitive documents to 
protect its national security."167 The court held that the publication of' 
technical information on a hydrogen bomb is analogous to the publi-
cation of troop movements, which falls within the narrow exception of 
162 Id. at 745-46 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("When Congress specifically 
declines to make conduct unlawful it is not for this Court to redecide those issues."). 
163 Id. at 758 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The very nature of Executive decisions 
as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.") (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines 
v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
164 Id. 
165 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 716-23 (Black and 
Douglas, JJ.). 
166 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (D. Wis. 1979) (alt-
hough the article was mostly information in the public domain, the Court held that 
publication violated the Atomic Energy Act of 1954). 
167 Id. at 992-93. 
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prior restraints, as discussed in Near. 168 Furthermore, the court applied 
Justice Stewart's reasoning in the Pentagon Papers case for the na-
tional security exception, 169 stating that the information could poten-
tially pose a "direct, immediate and irreparable harm to the United 
States."170 
Next, the Supreme Court allowed prior restraints to protect na-
tional security in Snepp v. United States where the Court held that the 
government could insist that a former CIA agent submit his book to 
the CIA for prepublication review. 171 Snepp is noteworthy as the 
broadest holding by the Supreme Court on this issue because it al-
lowed a prior restraint on the basis of the national security exception, 
even absent any evidence that the contents of the book were damaging 
to security interests. 172 Another recent example of the national securi-
ty exception is Haig v. Agee where the Court held that an ex-CIA 
agent's, "repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and names of 
intelligence personnel," were as constitutionally unprotected as "the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and loca-
tion of troops."173 In particular, the Court said that the First Amend-
ment did not protect disclosures when they were done to obstruct "in-
telligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel." 174 
B. The True Threats Exception 
The Supreme Court has stated that there is no First Amendment 
protection for a "true threat" 175 because, unlike political rhetoric or 
other protected speech, "true threats" pose greater harm. 176 Therefore, 
168 Id. at 996 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 701-04 (1931). 
169 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730. 
170 Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 996 (This case was dismissed on appeal 
because independent foreign sources published the same information during the ap-. 
peals process). See generally United States v. Progressive, Inc. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 
1979). 
171 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 961 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 
U.S. 507 (1980)). 
172 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 961. 
173 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981) (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716). 
174 Id. at 309. 
175 CHEMERINSKY supra note 31, at 1000, (citing Watts v. United States, 394 
U.S. 705, 708 (1969); Madsen v. Women's Health Center 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994)). 
176 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). The key case for defin-
ing when the government may punish advocacy of illegality is Brandenburg v. Ohio. 
395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, a KKK leader is convicted under the Ohio 
criminal syndicalism law for leading rallies for the KKK and showing films that in~it­
ed racism and anti-Semitism. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and a conviction for incitement is only constitutional ifthere is: (1) imminent 
harm;' (2) a likelihood of producing illegal action; and (3) an intent to cause imminent 
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intelligence personnel," were as constitutionally unprotected as "the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and loca-
tion of troops." 173 In particular, the Court said that the First Amend-
ment did not protect disclosures when they were done to obstruct "in-
telligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel."174 
B. The True Threats Exception 
The Supreme Court has stated that there is no First Amendment 
protection for a "true threat" 175 because, unlike political rhetoric or 
other protected speech, "true threats" pose greater harm. 176 Therefore, 
168 Id. at 996 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 701-04 (1931). 
169 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730. 
170 Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 996 (This case was dismissed on appeal 
because independent foreign sources published the same information during the ap-
peals process). See generally United States v. Progressive, Inc. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 
1979). 
171 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 961 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 
U.S. 507 (1980)). 
172 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 961. 
173 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981) (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716). 
174 Id. at 309. 
175 CHEMERINSKY supra note 31, at 1000, (citing Watts v. United States, 394 
U.S. 705, 708 (1969); Madsen v. Women's Health Center 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994)). 
176 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). The key case for defin-
ing when the government may punish advocacy of illegality is Brandenburg v. Ohio. 
395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, a KKK leader is convicted under the Ohio 
criminal syndicalism law for leading rallies for the KKK and showing films that incit-
ed racism and anti-Semitism. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and a conviction for incitement is only constitutional ifthere is: (1) imminent 
harm;' (2) a likelihood of producing illegal action; and (3) an intent to cause imminent 
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advocating violence is protected, but threatening a person with vio-
lence is not. 177 The Supreme Court defined "true threats" in Watts v. 
US., where an anti-Vietnam war protestor said, "if they ever make me 
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J."178 The 
Court held that this statement was not a true threat because it was po-
litical hyperbole and thus was protected by the First Amendment. 179 
The Court later held that certain threats are unworthy of First 
Amendment protection, in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. 180 In R.A. V., the 
petitioner was charged with violating the St. Paul Bias Motivated 
Crime Ordinance for burning a cross on a black family's lawn. 181 The 
Court reasoned that true threats are beyond the scope of First 
Amendment protection, which is meant to protect "individuals from 
the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from 
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur."182 Hence, the 
true threats doctrine was designed to protect potential victims from 
both actual violence and the reasonable apprehension of fear. 183 If the 
target of the threat takes steps to protect himself, or is in some way 
disrupted from his normal course of activities, the deliverer of the 
threat can be punished regardless of his intent or capacity to execute 
the threat. 184 
However, the Supreme Court has never clearly defined what con-
stitutes a "true threat" and now there is a split among the circuits as to 
the definition. 185 In Watts, the Court suggested that a statement should 
be evaluated in its context, taking into account its conditional nature 
and the reaction of listeners. 186 In light of the limited guidance provid-
illegality. "The issue of "true threats" is related to Brandenburg because it involves 
speech that threatens violence, yet it is a distinct issue because the focus is not on the 
likely consequences, but on the need to protect people from the adverse effects of 
feeling threatened." Id. Due to the strict limitations for restricting speech under the 
incitement test, this note will not focus on incitement because it is unlikely that the 
speech was imminent or that WikiLeaks had the intent to harm informants. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 706. 
179 Id. at 708 ("[T]he statute initially requires the Government to prove a true 
threat. We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner 
fits within that statutory term."). 
180 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
181 Id. at 379-80. 
182 Id. at 388. 
183 Id. See also Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) ("The speaker 
need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats 
protects individuals from the fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, 
as well as from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur."). 
184 Weiss, supra note 30, at 1313. 
185 CHEMERINSKY supra note 31, at 1000. 
186 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
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ed by the Supreme Court, lower courts have been left largely to their 
own devices to develop true threats jurisprudence. 187 For instance, the 
Second Circuit has held that a "true threat" is assessed from the per-
spective for the reasonable speaker, 188 while the Ninth Circuit has 
defined a "true threat" from the perspective of the reasonable listen-
er.189 
Despite these variances, commentators generally regard the stand-
ard set forth by the Second Circuit in United States v. Kelner190 as the 
most speech-protective test created by the lower courts. 191 In Kelner, a 
member of the Jewish Defense League was convicted for threatening 
to assassinate Y asser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization. 192 In recognition of First Amendment concerns ad-
vanced by the Supreme Court in Watts, the Second Circuit held that 
an expression may be considered a true threat "[s]o long as the threat 
on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequiv-
ocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threat-
ened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of exe-
cution." 193 The Court reasoned that a narrow construction of "threat" 
was intended by Watts and necessary to ensure the preservation of 
First Amendment rights. 194 
More recently, however, the Second Circuit, in United States v. 
Malik, has retreated from its strict speaker-based construction. 195 Ma-
lik was charged with mailing threatening communications to adver-
saries in his lawsuit, their families, and a United States federal 
judge. 196 The Second Circuit held that the absence of explicitly threat-
ening language does not necessarily preclude the finding of a threat. 197 
187 See Weiss, supra note 30, at 1313 (citing Robert Kurman, United States v. 
Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287, 303 
(1998) (documenting that the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a number of 
cases that presented an opportunity to clarify its true threats doctrine)). 
188 United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976). 
189 See Lovell v. Poway Unified District, 90 F .3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996); See 
also Weiss, supra note 30, at 1320. 
190 See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1020. 
191 Weiss, supra note 30, at 1315. 
192 Kelner, 534 F .2d at 1020-21 (Kelner was convicted under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2, 875(c) which prohibits threatening language and extortion). 
193 Id. at 1027. 
194 Id. 
195 United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994). 
196 Id. at 47-48. 
197 Id. at 49 (The Second Circuit clarified that ambiguous threats, standing 
alone, cannot establish a predicate for criminal liability. However, if substantial addi-
tional contextual evidence is presented- including evidence of the recipients' states 
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Furthermore, in evaluating Malik' s arguably ambiguous threats, the 
Court adhered to a reasonable listener test, which allowed for contex-
tual evidence to clarify whether ambiguous language constituted a, 
true threat. 198 Ultimately, the Court did not find that the defendant had 
First Amendment immunity in regards to this potential "true threat." 
A Ninth Circuit case that considered both definitions put forth by 
the Second Circuit was Planned Parenthood of the Colum-
bia/Willamette, 199 where the Defendants terrorized abortion providers 
with disturbing posters, online campaigns, and how-to guides on vio-
lent intimidation. 200 One of the documents posted, the "Nuremberg 
Files," included the names and home addresses of the Plaintiff abor-
tion providers and compared their actions to Nazi war criminals in 
World War II. 201 The messages were so violent the FBI stepped in to 
offer protection. 202 Furthermore, the postings were carried out in a 
period of escalating violence towards abortion providers, in one cir-
din . d 203 cumstance en g m mur er. 
The Defendants wanted the Court to apply the Second Circuit 
standard, which strips First Amendment immunity from true threats 
only when they are stated, "so unequivocal[ly ], unconditional[ly ], 
immediate[ly] and specific[ ally] as to the person threatened, as to 
convey ... imminent prospect of execution."204 However, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled against the protestors, fmding that the First Amendment 
does not protect this speech when a reasonable person would foresee 
the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault, con-
sidered in light of their entire factual context. 205 In conclusion, the 
Court found that the Nuremberg Files, containing names and address-
es, constituted a "true threat" and Defendants were given no First 
Amendment immunity protection. 
of mind and their reactions - "the existence of a 'true threat' is a question best left to 
a jury."). 
198 Id. 
199 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coal. of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). 
200 Id. at 1012. 
201 Id. at 1012-13. 
202 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coal. of Life 
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998). 
203 Id. at 1188 (referencing the murder of Dr. David Gunn in March, 1993 by 
the anti-abortionist Christian terrorist, Michael F. Griffin). 
204 United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1976). 
205 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
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C. Crime-Facilitating Speech and the Hit Man Handbook 
The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted the issue of 
when crime-facilitating speech should be unprotected by the First 
Amendment.206 However, the concept of crime-facilitating speech 
weaves through a number of many seemingly disparate decisions in 
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts.207 The doctrine itself is 
becoming more important as scholars have begun to link these dispar-
ate cases in order to develop a clear rule on crime facilitation and the 
First Amendment. One scholar, Eugene Volokh, defmes crime-
facilitating speech as: 
1.) any communication that, 
2.) intentionally or not, 
3.) conveys information that, 
4.) makes it easier or safer for some readers: 
(a) to commit crimes, torts, act of war; or 
(b) to get away with committing such act. 208 
Examples of crime-facilitating speech range from a website that 
publicizes the names and addresses of boycott violators209 to a news-
paper that publishes personal information about witnesses to a 
crime.210 In the area of national security, crime-facilitating speech 
may include a newspaper's publication of the sailing dates of troop-
h. 211 ·1· 1 212 h f d . s 1ps, secret rm 1tary p ans, or t e names o un ercover agents m 
206 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1103. 
207 Id. at 1104. 
208 Id. at 1103. 
209 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (rejecting 
lawsuit that was based partly on distribution of boycott violators' names). See also 
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099. 
210 See Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n, 787 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that based on the factual determination of whether the information was 
newsworthy, a newspaper may be held liable for to the publication of the identities of 
people in the witness protection program). See also Volokh, supra note 20, at 1098-99 
(including the publication of"the name of a witness to a crime" as possible speech 
that aids in the commission of crime). 
211 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (''No one 
would question but that a government might prevent ... the "publication of the sail-
ing dates of transports or the number and location of troops"). See also Volokh, supra 
note 20, at 1099. 
212 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733-34 (1971) 
(White, J., concurring). See also Volokh supra note 20, at 1098 (noting that although 
Congress declined to give the President the power in time of war to "proscribe, under 
threat of criminal penalty, the publication of various categories of information related 
to national defense .... [M]embers of Congress appeared to have little doubt that 
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enemy counties. 213 One example of a court denying a defendant First 
Amendment immunity for crime-facilitating speech is the Hit Man 
case.
214 
1. Why is Crime-Facilitating Speech Valuable? 
An analysis of crime-facilitating speech is incredibly helpful be-
cause it weighs how valuable or useful the speech is before it is re-
stricted. 215 The Supreme Court assumes that all speech is valuable, 
unless the speech falls under a limited number of specific excep-
tions. 216 Although the Supreme Court has not settled on a definition of 
"valuable," it generally uses the term to describe a wide range of in-
formational speech including educational, entertaining, political, reli-
gious, or scientific materials.217 Frequently, instances of crime-
facilitating speech are a mix of valuable and invaluable speech and 
have a wide range of uses for readers. 218 
Crime-facilitating speech may be valuable when it aids listeners in 
making political decisions or investigating government misconduct.219 
The general public may be more likely to advocate for change in gov-
ernmental policy when presented with persuasive and current proof of 
alleged abuse. 22° For instance, a published study about the specific 
ways that hijackers evade airport metal-detection equipment may fuel 
political debate on the topic of airport security. 221 Similarly, publish-
newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing 
information of the type Congress had itself determined should not be revealed."). 
213 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981). See also Volokh, supra note 
20, at 1098 (noting that the speech had "the declared purpose of obstructing intelli-
gence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not 
protected by the Constitution."); Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099-1100 (noting the 
publication of "the names of undercover agents in enemy countries" as possible 
crime-facilitating speech). 
214 Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239-43 (4th Cir. 1997). 
215 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1111 (explaining that crime-facilitating 
speech may also help others engage in "legal or useful" behaviors). 
216 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 531 (1948) ("Though we can see 
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled 
to the protection of free speech as the best ofliterature."). 
217 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1111 (noting the "Court has pretty consistently 
treated as "valuable" a wide range of commentary"). 
218 Id. at 1111-26. 
219 Id. at 1114. 
220 Id. (noting that "[a] general complaint that some unspecified abuse is 
happening somewhere will naturally leave most listeners skeptical."). 
221 Id. at 1118-19 (noting that the publication of this type of information can 
"show that the government isn't doing enough to protect us). See generally Bruce 
Schneier, More Airline Insecurities, CRYPTO-GRAMNEWSLETTER (Aug. 15, 2003,), 
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ing information about how easy it is to build a nuclear bomb may en-
hance the discussion of policies related to non-proliferation. 222 
2. When Crime-Facilitating Speech is Restricted 
The First Amendment has long protected speech that advocates il-
legality, even when the speech has no valuable purpose. 223 Yet, 
speakers forgo this protection when the effect of the speech would 
lead to imminent harm, 224 or when the speech is used as a guide to 
violating a criminal statute. 225 In Hit Man, the Fourth Circuit held 
"that the First Amendment does not pose a bar to a finding that Pala-
din is civilly liable as an aider and abetter of Perry's triple contract 
murders. "226 The Court alluded that the Hit Man Handbook publica-
tion was offensive to the preservation of an ordered society, 227 and 
noted that just because a publication takes a written form does not 
mean that it is deserving of all constitutional immunities. 228 In conclu-
sion, the Fourth Circuit found that the jury could fmd the publisher 
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0308.html (describing how anyone can theo-
retically smuggle plastic explosives onto a plane, or build a knife out of steel epoxy 
glue on the plane itself, and concluding "[t] he point here is to realize that security 
screening will never be 100% effective. There will always be ways to sneak guns, 
knives, and bombs through security checkpoints. Screening is an effective component 
of a security system, but it should never be the sole countermeasure in the system."). 
222 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1119; but see U.S. v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. 
Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (rejecting defendant's argument that "publication 
[of an article detailing the specifics of hydrogen bombs] will provide the people with 
needed information to make informed decisions on an urgent issue of public con-
cern."). 
223 Id. at 1111-26 (evaluating the possible valuable uses of crime-facilitating 
speech, and specifically noting that "much crime-facilitating speech indeed has at 
least some First Amendment value."). 
224 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997). 
225 Id. (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 
(1949). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. (citing Giboney 336 u."s. 502) ("Such an expansive interpretation of 
the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible 
ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other 
agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society."). 
·
228 Id. ("But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech 
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed."). 
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enemy counties. 213 One example of a court denying a defendant First 
Amendment immunity for crime-facilitating speech is the Hit Man 
case.
214 
1. Why is Crime-Facilitating Speech Valuable? 
An analysis of crime-facilitating speech is incredibly helpful be-
cause it weighs how valuable or useful the speech is before it is re-
stricted. 215 The Supreme Court assumes that all speech is valuable, 
unless the speech falls under a limited number of specific excep-
tions. 216 Although the Supreme Court has not settled on a definition of 
"valuable," it generally uses the term to describe a wide range of in-
formational speech including educational, entertaining, political, reli-
gious, or scientific materials.217 Frequently, instances of crime-
facilitating speech are a mix of valuable and invaluable speech and 
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ernmental policy when presented with persuasive and current proof of 
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ways that hijackers evade airport metal-detection equipment may fuel 
political debate on the topic of airport security. 221 Similarly, publish-
newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing 
information of the type Congress had itself determined should not be revealed."). 
213 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981). See also Volokh, supra note 
20, at 1098 (noting that the speech had "the declared purpose of obstructing intelli-
gence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not 
protected by the Constitution."); Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099-1100 (noting the 
publication of"the names of undercover agents in enemy countries" as possible 
crime-facilitating speech). 
214 Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239-43 (4th Cir. 1997). 
215 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1111 (explaining that crime-facilitating 
speech may also help others engage in "legal or useful" behaviors). 
216 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 531 (1948) ("Though we can see 
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled 
to the protection of free speech as the best ofliterature."). 
217 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1111 (noting the "Court has pretty consistently 
treated as "valuable" a wide range of commentary"). 
218 Id. at 1111-26. 
219 Id. at 1114. 
220 Id. (noting that "[a] general complaint that some unspecified abuse is 
happening somewhere will naturally leave most listeners skeptical."). 
221 Id. at 1118-19 (noting that the publication of this type of information can 
"show that the government isn't doing enough to protect us). See generally Bruce 
Schneier, More Airline Insecurities, CRYPTO-GRAMNEWSLETTER (Aug. 15, 2003,), 
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ing information about how easy it is to build a nuclear bomb may en-
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http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0308.html (describing how anyone can theo-
retically smuggle plastic explosives onto a plane, or build a knife out of steel epoxy 
glue on the plane itself, and concluding "[t] he point here is to realize that security 
screening will never be 100% effective. There will always be ways to sneak guns, 
knives, and bombs through security checkpoints. Screening is an effective component 
of a security system, but it should never be the sole countermeasure in the system."). 
222 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1119; but see U.S. v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. 
Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (rejecting defendant's argument that "publication 
[of an article detailing the specifics of hydrogen bombs] will provide the people with 
needed information to make informed decisions on an urgent issue of public con-
cern."). 
223 Id. at 1111-26 (evaluating the possible valuable uses of crime-facilitating 
speech, and specifically noting that "much crime-facilitating speech indeed has at 
least some First Amendment value."). 
224 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997). 
225 Id. (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 
(1949). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. (citing Giboney 336 u.·s. 502) ("Such an expansive interpretation of 
the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible 
ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other 
agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society."). 
228 Id. ("But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech 
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed."). 
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equally liable for its part in the conspiracy because the publication 
was integral in effectuating criminal activity.229 
On the other hand, punishing this kind of speech may set a diffi-
cult future precedent. 230 In Hit Man, the Fourth Circuit recognized that 
a right to advocate lawlessness is one of the safeguards ofliberty.231 It 
further noted that there are some circumstances in which it is neces-
sary to restrict speech, especially when compelling concerns exist 
about the distribution of material to large, undifferentiated audienc-
es. 232 The Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment is not a bar to 
liability, and they remanded the case to allow the jury to decide the 
definition of valuable. 233 In conclusion, speech may lose the constitu-
tional protections of the First Amendment when the speech lacks val-
ue and aids directly in the facilitation of crime. 
IV. BALANCING WIKILEAKS 
A. Defining the Balancing Test 
As discussed above, the First Amendment offers a sweeping pro-
tection for civil and criminal liability and this immunity is only re-
voked in extreme circumstances.234 Ultimately, the courts will decide 
the matter of WikiLeaks' liability for any damage done by the organi-
zation's publication of classified material.235 This determination will 
require the judiciary to "balance" the value of the speech against the 
harm that the speech causes. 236 In this note, the balancing test involves 
balancing both the public concern doctrine and the potential valuable 
uses of WikiLeaks, against the invaluable nature of the unredacted 
logs and the First Amendment harmful speech exceptions. Because 
229 Id. at 266-67 (holding, with confidence, that "the First Amendment does 
not erect the absolute bar to the imposition of civil liability for which Paladin Press .. 
. contend[s]."). 
230 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1219 (noting that a decision like Rice's 
"may set an unexpected and unwelcomed precedent for other situations."). 
231 Rice 128 F.3d at 243 ("Even in a society oflaws, one of the most indispen-
sable freedoms is that to express in the most impassioned terms the most passionate 
disagreement with the laws themselves, the institutions of, and created by, law, and 
the individual officials with whom the laws and institutions are entrusted."). 
232 Id. at247 (citingHaigv. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1981)) 
233 Id. at 250. 
234 See supra Section IV. 
235 Sterner, supra note 73, at 3. 
236 Volokh supra note 20, at 1137 (suggesting such a balancing test, but cau-
tioning that it "might be seen as an instruction that the judge in each free speech case 
should simply think hard about both the value of the speech and the harm it causes, 
and decide which feels more important to him."). 
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the public concern doctrine is deeply rooted in First Amendment law, 
the three minor exceptions might not be individually sufficient to de-
feat First Amendment immunity. Nevertheless, this note argues that 
together the three are sufficient to prove that WikiLeaks is not shield-
ed against liability if a case is brought against the organization. Over-
all, the courts should apply a balancing test to ensure that parts of 
WikiLeaks' speech are protected but that the release of the inform-
ant's identities is not. 
A balancing test is not perfect because judges are human and 
therefore are susceptible to ideological and political in:fluences.237 But, 
judicial balancing tests are used in cases involving all of the First 
Amendment doctrines discussed in this note, and therefore a balancing 
test is an appropriate solution. First, courts are not precluded from 
making any judgments about the inherent value of speech. 238 Various 
First Amendment exceptions draw justification from the theory that 
certain speech has virtually no constitutional value. 239 Second, courts 
frequently balance the interests of the First Amendment with national 
security concerns. 24° Finally, the true threats doctrine balances the 
right to the freedom of speech with the need of the First Amendment 
to protect citizens from fear of violence. 241 Therefore, a balancing test 
is a natural way to look at novel ideas concerning WikiLeaks and po-
tential harm to U.S. soldiers or informants in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
231 Id. 
238 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1141 (noting the various First Amendment ex-
ceptions and explaining the justifications for these exceptions). 
239 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) 
("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."); see also 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (concluding that obscenity is 
of "such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality"). 
240 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is 'obvious and unargua-
ble' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Na-
tion."). 
241 Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) ("[T]he First Amendment 
permits a State to ban "true threats," which encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence ... [A] prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the 
fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur."). 
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the public concern doctrine is deeply rooted in First Amendment law, 
the three minor exceptions might not be individually sufficient to de-
feat First Amendment immunity. Nevertheless, this note argues that 
together the three are sufficient to prove that WikiLeaks is not shield-
ed against liability if a case is brought against the organization. Over-
all, the courts should apply a balancing test to ensure that parts of 
WikiLeaks' speech are protected but that the release of the inform-
ant's identities is not. 
A balancing test is not perfect because judges are human and 
therefore are susceptible to ideological and political influences. 237 But, 
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First Amendment exceptions draw justification from the theory that 
certain speech has virtually no constitutional value. 239 Second, courts 
frequently balance the interests of the First Amendment with national 
security concerns. 24° Finally, the true threats doctrine balances the 
right to the freedom of speech with the need of the First Amendment 
to protect citizens from fear of violence. 241 Therefore, a balancing test 
is a natural way to look at novel ideas concerning WikiLeaks and po-
tential harm to U.S. soldiers or informants in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
231 Id. 
238 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1141 (noting the various First Amendment ex-
ceptions and explaining the justifications for these exceptions). 
239 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) 
("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."); see also 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (concluding that obscenity is 
of "such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality"). 
240 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is 'obvious and unargua-
ble' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Na-
tion."). 
241 Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) ("[T]he First Amendment 
permits a State to ban "true threats," which encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence ... [A] prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the 
fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur."). 
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B. Application of the Balancing 
1. Public Concern v. Private Concern 
WikiLeaks has already started to change the world by sparking an 
international debate on secrecy and diplomacy. 242 However, the topic 
of this note is not the overall public concern of WikiLeaks, but specif-
ically the information relating to the unredacted names and addresses 
of informants. The Supreme Court held that "not all speech is of equal 
First Amendment importance, and where matters of purely private 
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less 
ri~orous. "243 This is because restricting speech that involves purely 
pnvate matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as 
limiting speech about matters of public interest. 244 Like Dun & Brad-
street, WikiLeaks is disseminating information that was solely the 
concern of the individual interest of the speaker (one U.S. solider) and 
his specific audience (U.S. Military Personnel).245 Additionally, the 
information is a private concern, because the content, form, and con-
text of the information published by WikiLeaks were private details of 
undercover informants in a war zone. 246 
The final consideration for matters of public concern is the truth-
fulness of the speech. 247 The WikiLeaks documents receive some ad-
242 For example many experts have speculated that WikiLeak:s cables helped 
spark the January 2011 uprising in Tunisia where President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali 
was ousted after 23 years in power. The overthrow of President Ben Ali in Tunisia 
has spread to other protests around the Middle East, creating unrest in the entire re-
gion. citing Scott Shane, Cables from American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence 
on Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A14 (quoting the cable, "Corruption in 
Tunisia is getting worse ... although the petty corruption rankles, it is the excesses of 
President Ben Ali's family that inspire outrage amount Tunisians ... with Tunisians 
facing rising inflation and high unemployment, the conspicuous displays of wealth 
and persistent rumors of corruption have added fuel to the fire."). 
243 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985). 
244 See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 ("[T]here is no threat to the free 
and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful 
dialogue of ideas."). 
245 Dun & Bradstreet presents a similar situation because the report was sent 
to only five subscribers from the reporting service, who were bound not to dissemi-
nate it further); see id at 749, 761 (evaluating whether the credit report was a matter 
of public concern). 
. 
2~6 See id. at 761 (~xplaining that the evaluation of whether speech is ofpub-
hc or pnvate concern reqmres the court to examine the '"content, form, and context"' 
of the speech, "as revealed by the whole record."). 
247 er B . lei V 0ee artmc v. opper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) (evaluating the 
application of the First Amendment to the publication of truthful information of pub-
lic concern). 
IS WIKILEAKS A HIT MAN HANDBOOK? 395 
ditional legal protection due to their truthfulness.248 U.S. Government 
officials have verified this fact by saying, "[i]n the history of Wik-
iLeaks, nobody has claimed the material being put out is not authen-
tic."249 In conclusion, the public concern doctrine gives broad First 
Amendment protection to the overall WikiLeaks releases, but the un-
redacted names should be matters of private concern and therefore 
more restricted. 
2. WikiLeaks Is Both Valuable and Invaluable 
First, WikiLeaks is valuable because it helps readers make politi-
cal decisions on issues such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both 
sets of War Logs are an encyclopedic depiction of the day-to-day ac-
tivities of the U.S. military in these countries.250 The Afghan War 
Logs add to the political discussion by showing that after nine years of 
warfare the U.S. government and NATO forces have not tamed the 
chaos in the country. 251 The Iraq War Logs contribute to the discourse 
by cataloging just how many ordinary Iraqis had been killed since the 
war efforts began.252 These facts add important information to the on-
going debate about U.S. involvement in the Middle East. 
Yet, there is debate on the value of this information to the general 
understanding of the war efforts. On one hand, WikiLeaks argues that 
public scrutiny of otherwise unaccountable and secretive institutions 
forces them to consider the ethical implications of their actions. 253 
Contrastingly, there is usually a reason to keep national security doc-
uments a secret. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton points out, 
"[t]errorists have taken advantage of the openness of our societies to 
carry out their plots .... As we work to advance freedoms, we must 
also work against those who use communication networks as tools of 
d. . d .c. ,,254 1sruptlon an i_ear. 
248 ELSEA supra note 28, at 13 ("[P]ublication of truthful information that is 
lawfully acquired enjoys considerable First Amendment protection."). 
249 Ashley Fantz, New Massive Release to Put Iraq War and WikiLeaks in 
Spotlight, CNN (Oct. 22, 2010) 
http//edition.cnn.com/2010/US/10/22/wikileaks.iraq.documents/index.html?iref=mpst 
oryview. 
250 LEIGH, supra note 9, at 107. 
251 Id at 127 (Moreover, that a war "fought ... for the hearts and minds of 
Afghans cannot be won like this."). 
252 Id. at 128 (The Iraq War Logs were "all about the numbers."). 
253 WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 42. 
254 Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, on Internet Freedom at the Newseum 
in Washington (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. 
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lawfully acquired enjoys considerable First Amendment protection."). 
249 Ashley Fantz, New Massive Release to Put Iraq War and WikiLeaks in 
Spotlight, CNN (Oct. 22, 2010) 
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252 Id. at 128 (The Iraq War Logs were "all about the numbers."). 
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Se~ond, Wiki~eaks is valuable because it helps point out flaws in 
o~r i:iat10nal ~ec~ty strategy. ~fter September 11, 2001, file sharing 
within U.S. mtelhgence 2~gencies boomed, presumably to increase 
counter-terrorism efforts. Some commentators fear that this valua-
ble intelligence gathering and sharing will suffer the most from the 
WikiL ks 256 ea. . saga. However, others have expressed outrage that al-
most a rmlh~n people had access to these files, arguing that it was just 
a matter of trme before someone like Bradley Manning released them 
to Assange. 
257 
Overall, WikiLeaks has contributed to the debate on 
how, what, when, and how much security information needs to be 
classified. 
Third, WikiLeaks helps outsiders investigate perceived govern-
ment misconduct. 258 Any WikiLeaks reader can fmd missteps of 
American troops in both the Afghan and Iraq War Logs. For example, 
the A~ghan War Logs provide details into. questionable battles be-
twee~ msurge~t for~es and the U.S. military259 and the Iraq War Logs 
provide a detailed mcident-by-incident report of at least 66 081 vio-
lent deaths of civilians in Iraq since the invasion. 260 Additio~ally, the 
Iraq. War L~gs seem to paint a disturbing picture of American troops 
~g a bl":1d ey~ to ~he abuse of Iraqis by fellow Iraqis. 261 All of 
this mformat10n will aid future investigations into government mis-
conduct. 
O~ the ~ther ~and, WikiLeaks discloses some highly sensitive in-
format10n, mcludmg the names of U.S. informants. This sort of in-
255 J Kin 
eremy sman,. Troth and Consequence: the WikiLeaks Saga, POLICY 
0PTIO~s ~(Feb. 2011) [heremafter Kinsman] (citing the co-chairman of the 9/11 
<?omnnss10n, Le~ Hamilton who testified that "poor information sharing was the 
smgle ~~atest failure of our government in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks."). 
Eveny Morozov, WikiLeaks and the Perils of Extreme Glasnost, NEW 
PERSPE~5~NES QUARTERLY Vol. 28, Issue 1, 7 (Winter 2011). 
Id; See also, Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World Growing 
Beyond Control, WASH. POST, (July 19, 2010), available at 
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formation is especially helpful to terrorists b~cau~e co~ttin? an a.ct 
of terrorism is considerably easier when detailed mformat10n is avail-
able. 262 For example, detailed information such as, '~here is ~ow ~ou 
can make a silencer," is more helpful than general mformat10n, hke 
"resist the temptation to brag about your crimes. "263 Therefore,. non-
obvious information like "here is a list of U.S. infonnants," will be 
more helpful to insurgents than obvious information like, "on _S~p­
tember 4, 2008 U.S. forces were in Khandahar."264 In gen~ral, givmg 
detailed information is more dangerous and can be destructive. 
3. National Security Exception 
Under Part IV, this note analyzed the national security exce~tion 
and found that courts are willing to temper First Amendment nghts 
when the government can prove that the information will "s.urely ~e­
sult in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nat10n or its 
people. "265 While this is a very hi?h burden to prove, ,court~ have long 
been extremely reluctant to quest10n the government s claims of con-
fidentiality in the name of national security.266 The attacks of Septem-
ber 11 have only reinforced this reluctance. 267 After 9/11, the Supr~me 
Court has held that terrorism or other special circumstances U:U.ght 
warrant "heightened deference to the judgments of the political 
. l .ty ,,268 branches with respect to matters of natlona secun . . . 
The death or disappearance of U.S. informants ~r sol~iers m. the 
U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq result~ in.a drrect, Jgnnedrnte, 
and irreparable damage to our national secunty mterests. Further-
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more, the national security exception should protect the loss of life as 
well as the loss of valuable information that will lead to pro-
democracy movements and a steady end to the war efforts. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton asserted that the leaks "put people's lives in 
danger, threatens our national security, and undermines [U.S.] efforts 
to work with other countries to solve shared problems"270 Indeed, 
counterterrorism communications need special protection in order to 
maintain the integrity of the information received.271 
Furthermore, WikiLeaks is not the Pentagon Papers case. The 
Pentagon Papers case was seen as a victory for the New York Times 
because it took extraordinary steps to diminish the harm of the release 
and the government dramatically overstated the risk of information 
disclosure.272 The WikiLeaks case is very different because the U.S. 
does not have the jurisdiction to remove the documents from the web 
site, nor does it have the power to enforce an injunction. 273 The main 
distinction, however, is that the New York Times carefully followed a 
set of ethical precepts derived both from journalistic norms and under-
lying American values. 274 In contrast, WikiLeaks does not discuss its 
model for redaction, nor does it seem to have a consistent redaction 
protocol. 275 This is particularly worrisome for future releases because 
the decision to publish is made with limited outside input and with a 
potentially significant impact. 276 
WikiLeaks supporters could counter the attacks on its professional 
ethics by pointing to the lack of impact the information has had on 
national security interests. Indeed, the Pentagon has acknowledged 
that they do not know of anyone in Afghanistan harmed due to the 
releases.277 Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has esti-
mated that the "consequences" for U.S. foreign policy are "fairly 
modest."278 However, this does not mean that there are not future risks 
as the Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to study Wik-
and react in combat situations, even the capability of our equipment. This security 
breach could very well get our troops and those they are :fighting with killed."). 
270 Kinsman, supra note 255, at 1. 
271 Id. at 2. 
272 Bambauer, supra note 63, at 10. 
273 Id. at 3. See also Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 
980 (2008). 
274 Bambauer, supra note 63, at 4. 
275 Id. at 8. 
276 Id. at 10. 
277 Ashley Fantz, New Massive Release to Put Iraq War and WikiLeaks in 
Spotlight, CNN, Oct. 22, 2010, available at 
http// edition.cnn.com/201O/US/10/22/wikileaks.iraq .documents/index.html ?iref-=mpst 
oryview. 
278 Kinsman, supra note 255, at 2. 
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iLeaks. Additionally, Snepp broadened the national security exception 
to allow courts to find liability without substantial evidence of a na-
tional security risk. 279 Therefore, the fact that no deaths have yet oc-
curred does not mean that WikiLeaks cannot face future prosecution 
or that the unredacted logs are not potentially harmful. 
4. True Threats 
If indicted on civil 280 or criminal charges, 281 WikiLeaks could not 
use First Amendment immunity as a defense because the speech is 
unprotected under the doctrine of true threats. A Taliban spokesperson 
claims the Taliban has formed a "nine-member commission" to mine 
WikiLeaks and find "people who are spying. "282 This should come as 
no shock to WikiLeaks founders. Reporters from the Guardian and 
the New York Times both expressed concerns about the lack of redac-
tions in the Afghan War Logs. 283 As Guardian reporter David Leigh 
stated, it was clearly possible to work out identities of informants 
"with the help of some local knowledge and to publish the log might 
lead to the Taliban executing [mentioned] Afghans."284 However, 
when Leigh asked Assange about publishing the informant names, his 
response was, "Well, they're informants, so, if they get killed, they've 
got it coming to them. They deserve it. "285 Assange' s callousness was 
noted by Bill Keller, the Executive Editor of the New York Times, 
who refused to link directly to the WikiLeaks cable dump from their 
own website. 286 Keller stated, "We feared, rightly, as it turned out -
that their trove would contain the names of low-level informants and 
make them Taliban targets."287 
WikiLeaks' massive release of classified information and unfil-
tered military reports from Iraq and Afghanistan placed the lives of 
U.S. allies and pro-democracy forces at risk by giving terrorist groups 
279 CHEMERINSKY' supra note 31, at 961. 
280 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Alien Tort Claims Act, see supra note 39. 
281 50 U.S.C. § 421-426, Intelligence Identities Protection Act, see supra note 
39. 
282 Bums & Somaiya supra note 11. 
283 LEIGH, supra note 9, at 111 and 114. 
284 See id. at 111 (quoting David Leigh was "worried about the repercussions 
of publishing these names, who could easily be killed by the Taliban or other militant 
groups if identified."). 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 114 (additionally, the New York Times feared "that readers- and 
indeed their own hostile US government - would not see the paper's staff as detached 
reporters if they directed readers to WikiLeaks"). 
281 Id. 
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a "hit list. "288 There is a true threat to the lives of these Afghan in-
formants, and the U.S. soldiers protecting them, because of the Tali-
ban's indiscriminate use of force, and the group's harsh treatment of 
prisoners. 289 According to UN statistics, the Taliban is now blamed 
for more than three-fourths of all civilian casualties, and those casual-
ties increased by 20 percent last year. wo Taliban brutality is likely to 
increase as NATO forces escalate attacks on Taliban strongholds in 
order to weaken the insurgent groups before the planned end-date of 
combat operations in 2014.291 
Increased Taliban violence proves there is a true threat to the un-
redacted persons. In R.A. V., the Court emphasized that true threats go 
against the purpose of First Amendment protection, which is meant to 
shield individuals from the fear of violence. 292 Additionally, the true 
threats doctrine was designed to protect potential victims from the 
reasonable apprehension of fear of violence, as well as the actual vio-
lence. 293 In the case of WikiLeaks, those mentioned in the Afghan and 
Iraq War Logs have a reasonable fear of violence, justified by over a 
decade of brutal acts conducted by the Taliban. 
Indeed, the WikiLeaks releases parallel the true threats in the Nu-
remberg Files. 294 Both publications gave names and addresses of po-
tential victims to potential killers.295 In Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Williamette, the standard for a true threat is when a reason-
able person would foresee the statement as a serious expression of 
intent to harm or assault, considered in light of their entire factual 
288 STERNER supra note 73, at 1. 
289 RUBIN supra note 13 (quoting "Taliban are very harsh to those who have 
been convicted of spying and those who have an affiliation with the government and 
the foreigners,' said one elder, Hajji Maitiullah Khan. 'People convicted of such 
crimes can be beaten up severely.' One man, he said, was given 500 lashes a day for 
several days."). 
290 Rod Nordland, Afghan Rights Groups Shift Focus to Taliban, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/world/asia/lOafghanistan.html 
(stating, "[Insurgent] attacks caused more than 1,800 civilian deaths from January to 
October 2010. By comparison, NATO forces are blamed for up to 508 civilian deaths 
last year."). 
291 Erin Cuningham, Robert Gates Says U.S. Should Maintain Afghanistan 
Presence After 2014, THE NATIONAL, (Mar. 8, 2011) 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/robert-gates-says-us-should-
maintain-afghanistan-presence-after-2014. 
292 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. 
293 Weiss supra note 30, at 1313. 
294 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coali-
tion of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
295 Id. at 1188 (the Nuremberg Files contain personal identifying information 
of the Plaintiffs). 
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context. 296 In the Second Circuit, WikiLeaks would also not be grant-
ed immunity under the First Amendment because a reasonable listener 
is allowed to present contextual evidence to clarify whether ambigu-
1 . d hr 297 ous anguage constitute a true t eat. Therefore, any charges 
brought against WikiLeaks would need to be examined under the First 
Amendment. 
Another similarity between WikiLeaks and the Nuremberg Files 
is that third parties, and not the hit men themselves, published both 
the names and addresses of targets. 298 The Ninth Circuit held, in the 
case of the Nuremberg Files, that the Plaintiffs had an actionable 
claim of a true threat. 299 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
lack of expressly threatening language is not necessary as long as the 
speech can be considered a true threat "in light of their entire factual 
context."300 Therefore, the Courts should consider the situation sur-
rounding the released names and addresses in context of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the brutal nature of the Taliban and Iraqi 
insurgent forces. 
5. Crime-Facilitating Speech 
When WikiLeaks released the Afghan and Iraq War Logs, it unin-
tentionally conveyed information to insurgent groups that made it 
easier for them to commit acts of war against U.S. military forces and 
informants. This fits the stated definition for crime-facilitating 
speech. 301 While the doctrine of crime-facilitating speech has not been 
addressed directly by the Supreme Court, 302 it is easy to make a com-
parison between WikiLeaks and examples of crime-facilitation cases. 
First, many of the crime-facilitation cases fall under the national secu-
rity and true threats exception. 303 Second, WikiLeaks parallels the Hit 
296 Id. at 1194. 
297 United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994). 
298 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia!Williamette, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 
1188. 
299 Id. at 1193. 
300 Id. at 1194 (citing Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F .3d 367, 
372 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
301 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1103. 
302 Id. 
303 F th t. 1 . . · or e na 1ona secunty except10n cases, see Umted States v. Progressive, 
Inc, 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979) (where a publisher released information on how to build 
a hydrogen bomb); and Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (where a former 
CIA agent wished to publish details relating to his work with the CIA). See also Vo-
lokh, supra note 20, at 12. For the true threats exception cases, see Planned 
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists 23 F 
Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998). See also Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099. ' . 
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292 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. 
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294 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coali-
tion of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
295 Id. at 1188 (the Nuremberg Files contain personal identifying information 
of the Plaintiffs). 
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context. 296 In the Second Circuit, WikiLeaks would also not be grant-
ed immunity under the First Amendment because a reasonable listener 
is allowed to present contextual evidence to clarify whether ambigu-
ous language constituted a true threat. 297 Therefore, any charges 
brought against WikiLeaks would need to be examined under the First 
Amendment. 
Another similarity between WikiLeaks and the Nuremberg Files 
is that third parties, and not the hit men themselves, published both 
the names and addresses of targets. 298 The Ninth Circuit held, in the 
case of the Nuremberg Files, that the Plaintiffs had an actionable 
claim of a true threat. 299 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
lack of expressly threatening language is not necessary as long as the 
speech can be considered a true threat "in light of their entire factual 
context."300 Therefore, the Courts should consider the situation sur-
rounding the released names and addresses in context of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the brutal nature of the Taliban and Iraqi 
insurgent forces. 
5. Crime-Facilitating Speech 
When WikiLeaks released the Afghan and Iraq War Logs, it unin-
tentionally conveyed information to insurgent groups that made it 
easier for them to commit acts of war against U.S. military forces and 
informants. This fits the stated definition for crime-facilitating 
speech. 301 While the doctrine of crime-facilitating speech has not been 
addressed directly by the Supreme Court, 302 it is easy to make a com-
parison between WikiLeaks and examples of crime-facilitation cases. 
First, many of the crime-facilitation cases fall under the national secu-
rity and true threats exception. 303 Second, WikiLeaks parallels the Hit 
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297 United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994). 
298 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 
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300 Id. at 1194 (citing Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F .3d 367, 
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301 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1103. 
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303 F th t. 1 . · · or e na 10na secunty exception cases, see Umted States v. Progressive, 
Inc, 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979) (where a publisher released information on how to build 
a hydrogen bomb); and Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (where a former 
CIA agent wished to publish details relating to his work with the CIA). See also Vo-
lokh, supra note 20, at 12. For the true threats exception cases, see Planned 
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. 
Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998). See also Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099. 
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Man case in that it offers valuable information for people who are 
already seeking to commit certain crimes. 304 When publication of a 
document makes it easier for criminals to commit crimes the law 
needs to question the broad right of publication. Finally, this note is 
suggesting that courts take a balanced and tempered approach to a 
specific situation in order to avoid setting an unexpected or unwel-
comed precedent. 305 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, WikiLeaks has, intentionally or not, put lives at 
risk and damaged U.S. national security interests. 306 Simply put, the 
harms outweigh the benefits. When courts balance the public concern 
doctrine, which is considered the highest rung of protected speech, 307 
against government's need to protect individuals from national securi-
ty risks, 308 true threats of violence, 309 and the over-arching problem 
associated with crime-facilitating speech,310 the harms to society are 
greater than the benefits of disclosure. While one of these three excep-
tions would probably not be enough to defeat First Amendment im-
munity311 on its own, the three concerns combined should be suffi-
cient to allow a plaintiff in a case against WikiLeaks to present evi-
dence linking the organization to the crimes committed, thereby de-
feating its First Amendment immunity. 
Any attempts to suppress WikiLeaks' speech would be highly im-
perfect, especially in the Internet age. 312 Therefore, the most our jus-
304 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1107 (quoting, "to commit a typical crime, a 
criminal generally needs to have three things: (1) the desire to commit the crime, (2) 
the knowledge and ability to do so, and (3)(a) the belief that the risk of being caught 
is low enough to make the benefits exceed the costs, (b) the willingness- often born 
of rage or felt ideological imperative- to act without regard to the risk, or ( c) a care-
less disregard for the risk." Insurgent groups generally possess all of the required 
elements above.). 
305 See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1219 (Crime-facilitating speech problems 
"ought to be resolved with an eye towards the broader issue. Otherwise, a solution 
that may seem appealing in one situation-for instance, concluding that the Hit Man 
murder manual should be punishable because all recklessly or knowingly crime-
facilitat#1g speech is unprotected-may set an unexpected and unwelcome precedent 
for other situations."). 
306 Sterner, supra note 34, at 1. 
307 Snyderv. Phelps 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
308 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
309 See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
310 See generally Volokh supra note 20, at 1057. 
311 See generally New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
312 Volokh supra note 20, at 1108. See also Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wik-
ileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (2008) (where the District Court noted the impossi-
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tice system can do is remove the shield of the First Amendment, as 
was done in the Hit Man case. 313 Removing this shield will only sub-
ject WikiLeaks to presenting evidence on the First Amendment issue 
and it is unlikely to be a severe intrusion on the organization's consti-
tutional rights. Furthermore, adopting the argument that WikiLeaks 
does not deserve First Amendment immunity will deter other similar 
organizations from also publishing harmful information.314 Overall, in 
considering the risk to national security and the broad true threats 
doctrine, the U.S. courts should view WikiLeaks as the next Hit Man 
Handbook, a detailed manual on how to find Rachel Redacted. 
bility of taking disclosed information offWikiLeaks and its mirror cites stating, "The 
cat is out of the bag and the issuance of an injunction would therefore be ineffective 
to protect the professed privacy rights of the bank's clients."); Mark Del Franco, 
Paladin Kills Off Part of Its Product Line, CATALOG AGE, Apr. 1, 2000, 14 (while 
civil lawsuit led publisher to stop distributing the Hit Man Handbook, versions are 
still available for free on the internet.). 
313 Rice v. Paladin Enterprises Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997). 
314 Strener, supra note 73, at 1 ("Wikileaks represents a growing trend that 
will undermine the long-term utility of the Internet for commerce and governance."). 
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COMMENTS 
THE PARABLE OF THE NON-
PLANTING ENTITY AND THE APPLE 
TREE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE 
OF NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES 
By Mitch Kline 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-practicing entities (''NPEs"), pejoratively referred to as "pa-
tent trolls," are controversial. 1 A "patent troll" is commonly defined 
as an entity that licenses and enforces patents, but does not produce 
any goods. 2 Critics accuse these entities of filing frivolous suits for 
infringement of weak patents, while contributing no social benefit 
through innovation or commercialization of their technologies. 3 
1 See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, PATENTLY-0 (Feb. 29, 2012, 10:39 
PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/guest-post-patent-troll-myths.html 
("Few players in the patent system (maybe none) are more hated than patent trolls."). 
2 See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and 
the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1810 (2007) (Patent trolls are 
"firms that use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture 
technology"); see also Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical 
Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010) (''NPEs are 
firms that rarely or never practice their patents, instead focusing on earning licensing 
fees."). 
3 See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 52 (2003) (testimony of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel oflntel Corpo-
ration) (noting that patent trolls purchase "improvidently granted patents from dis-
tressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses"); Shrestha, 
supra note 2, at 119 ("One of the most prominent criticisms against NPEs is that they 
acquire weak and obscure patents and use them to pursue 'baseless' litigation."). 
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